Brief for Laconic Baykeeper, Inc., Ima Fisher, Sam Schwimmer, Appellants/Cross-Appellees: Twentieth Annual Pace National Environmental Law Moot Court Competition by Buitrago, Alena et al.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 2 Summer 2008 Article 8
June 2008
Brief for Laconic Baykeeper, Inc., Ima Fisher, Sam
Schwimmer, Appellants/Cross-Appellees:
Twentieth Annual Pace National Environmental
Law Moot Court Competition
Alena Buitrago
Megan Bussey
Mindy Nunez
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alena Buitrago, Megan Bussey, and Mindy Nunez, Brief for Laconic Baykeeper, Inc., Ima Fisher, Sam
Schwimmer, Appellants/Cross-Appellees: Twentieth Annual Pace National Environmental Law Moot
Court Competition, 25 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 517 (2008)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss2/8
MEASURING BRIEF*
Civ. App. No. 07-1001
Civ. App. No. 07-1002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
LACONIC BAYKEEPER, INC., IMA FISHER,
and SAM SCHWIMMER, Appellants-Cross-Appellees
V.
STEPHEN JOHNSON, ADMINISTRATOR,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Appellee-Cross Appellant.
NEW UNION FARMERS INSTITUTE, UNION OF NEW
UNION PESTICIDE APPLICATORS, HAPPY VALLEY FARM,
INC., and WICCILLUM COPTERS, INC., Appellants
V.
STEPHEN JOHNSON, ADMINISTRATOR,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Appellee-Cross Appellant.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW UNION
BRIEF FOR LACONIC BAYKEEPER, INC., IMA FISHER,
SAM SCHWIMMER, APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
University of North Carolina School of Law
Alena Buitrago
Megan Bussey
Mindy Nunez
* This brief has been reprinted in its original form.
517
1
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .......................... 519
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ............................ 520
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................. 520
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ............................. 521
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................... 523
STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................. 525
ARGUM ENT ............................................... 525
I. Enviornmental Plaintiffs Satisfy Article III's
Standing Requirements In Their Challenge Of The
EPA's Regulatory Action .......................... 525
A. Constitutional Standing ....................... 526
1. Ima Fisher and Sam Schwimmer have
established that they have suffered an
"injury in fact." ............................ 526
2. Ima Fisher and Sam Schwimmer have
established that the injury is causally
related to the action challenged ............ 529
3. Ima Fisher and Sam Schwimmer have
established that the injury is subject to
redress by the court ........................ 529
B. Prudential Standing ........................... 530
C. Laconic Baykeeper, Inc. has associational
standing on behalf of Ima Fisher and Sam
Schwim m er .................................... 531
II. Jurisdiction in the District Court was Proper ...... 533
A. The regulations at issue do not constitute an
"effluent limitation or other limitation." ....... 533
B. The regulations at issue do not constitute the
"issuing or denying of a permit."............... 534
C. District court review was proper because there
was neither statutory ambiguity over
jurisdiction nor any congressional authority to
take judicial efficiency into consideration ...... 535
1. District Court Review was proper as there
was no statutory ambiguity over which
court had jurisdiction ...................... 535
2. Judicial efficiency argument flawed ....... 535
III. The Court Should Equitably Toll The 120 Day
Statute Of Limitations Of The CWA § 509(B)(1). .. 536
A. Plaintiffs exercised due diligence .............. 536
518 [Vol. 25
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss2/8
MEASURING BRIEF
B. Equitable tolling will result in no harm to the
defendants ..................................... 536
IV. The Industry Petitions' Challenge is Ripe Under
the Doctrine of Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner ..... 537
A. The industry plaintiffs' challenge to the
Pesticide Rule is fit for judicial decision ........ 537
1. The issue is purely legal ................... 538
2. Consideration of the issue would benefit
from a more concrete setting ............... 538
3. The agency's action is sufficiently final .... 539
B. The industry plaintiffs will suffer hardship if
the court withholds consideration .............. 539
V. The Pesticide Rule's Exemption of Certain
Pesticide Applications From the Clean Air Act's
Permitting Program is Not in Accordance With the
L aw ............................................... 540
A. EPA's adoption of the Pesticide Rule is
contrary to the Clean Water Act's plain
language and legislative history ................ 540
B. EPA's adoption of the Pesticide Rule
constitutes an impermissible construction of
the Clean Water Act ........................... 544
VI. The Failure Of The Pesticide Rule To Include
Within Its Exemption Pesticide Residues, Pesticies
Applied In Violation Of Fifra Requirements, And
Pesticides Applied Distant From Water But Which
Drift Into Water Is Not Arbitrary And Capricious,
An Abuse Of Discretion, Or Otherwise Not In
Accordance With The Law ......................... 545
CON CLU SION ............................................. 547
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This controversy presents federal questions arising under the
Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has juris-
diction over all claims on appeal in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2004) and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5
U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether the environmental plaintiffs have standing to
challenge the Pesticide Rule.
2. Whether the challenges to the Pesticide Rule should have
been brought directly in the Court of Appeals pursuant to CWA
§ 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. §1369(b)(1) precluding District Court juris-
diction over any challenge to the Pesticide Rule.
3. Whether, if this Court determines these cases should have
been commenced in the Court of Appeals, the Court should equita-
bly toll the 120 day statute of limitations of the CWA §509(b)(1),
33 U.S.C. §1369(b)(1).
4. Whether Industry Petitioner's challenge is ripe under the
doctrine of Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner.
5. Whether the Pesticide Rule's exemption of specified pesti-
cide application activities from the CWA permitting program was
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law.
6. Whether the failure of the Pesticide Rule to include within
its exemption pesticide residues, pesticides applied in violation of
FIFRA requirements, and pesticides applied distant from water
but which drift into water was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") issued
Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compli-
ance With FIFRA ("Pesticide Rule") on November 27, 2006. Appli-
cation of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance
With FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483 (Nov. 27, 2006). The Pesticide
Rule adopts an amendment to 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 that creates an
exemption to permitting requirements under section 402 of the
CWA. The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 40
C.F.R. § 122.3 (2004); Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(2004).
Appellants Laconic Baykeeper Inc. ("LBK"), Ima Fisher, and
Sam Schwimmer, ("environmental plaintiffs") commenced an ac-
tion against the EPA in the United States District Court for the
District of New Union. R. at 2. Environmental plaintiffs argued
that the EPA does not have authority to adopt any exemption
from the CWA permitting requirements for pesticides discharged
into waters of the United States. Id. This case was consolidated
520 [Vol. 25
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with Appellants New Union Farmers Institute, Union of New
Union Pesticide Applicators, Happy Valley Farm Inc., and Wiccil-
lum Copters, Inc., ("industry plaintiffs") who had commenced an
action against the EPA, which challenged the limited scope of the
exemption seeking a declaration that pesticide residues, pesticides
applied in violation of FIFRA requirements, and pesticides ap-
plied distant from water but which drift into water should all be
exempted from CWA permitting requirements. Id.
All parties moved for summary judgment. Id. The district
court granted the environmental plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment in part, holding: (1) EPA acted contrary to the express
intent of Congress when it purported to exempt biological (i.e.
non-chemical) pesticides and non aquatic pesticides applied over
or near water from CWA permitting requirements, and (2) indus-
try plaintiffs' challenges were not ripe under Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Id.
Environmental and industry plaintiffs both appealed and
EPA cross-appealed in both cases. This court certified six issues
for review. R. at 2-3.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiffs are Laconic Baykeeper, Ima Fisher and Sam
Schwimmer. LBK, a not for profit environmental organization, is
comprised of members who are both recreational and commercial
users of Laconic Bay, a body of water connected to the Laconic
Ocean. R. at 5. Ima Fisher, a third generation commercial
fisherperson and member of LBK uses and depends on Laconic
Bay for her livelihood. It is for this reason that Fisher is con-
cerned that the mosquito control pesticides used in the salt mar-
shes surrounding the bay will severely affect the marine life and
result in the death of fish and reduction of finish and crabs. Id.
Sam Schwimmer is a recreational user of Laconic Bay. Id. While
he does not depend on the bay to provide for his livelihood, he is
concerned that the use of pesticides around Laconic Bay will ex-
pose him to dangerous chemicals when he swims in Laconic Bay.
Furthermore, as an avid birdwatcher, he is concerned that the
chemicals will reduce his ability to bird watch. Id. Both Ima
Fisher and Sam Schwimmer have formally submitted their envi-
ronmental concerns in the form of affidavits which have not been
refuted either by the EPA or by industry plaintiffs. R. at 9.
Furthermore, while there have yet to be any reported human
cases of the West Nile Virus within the State of New Union, the
2008]
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City of Progress Health Department has nonetheless developed a
"Mosquito Control Plan" to implement if and when such a problem
should arise. R. at 6. As part of their plan, the city plans on using
a mosquito larvicide known as BTI to salt marshes adjacent to La-
conic Bay. Id. In addition, the city plans on using a chemical
adulticide, known as "Anvil 10 + 10," directly over Laconic Bay.
Id.
Although the City of Progress has not yet applied either the
BTI larvicide or Anvil 10 + 10 adulticide, they plan on "shortly
commencing" such operations which will have detrimental envi-
ronmental effects on the Bay. R. at 9. The environmental plain-
tiffs have documented the adverse affects on bodies of water in
cities which have already commenced a Mosquito Control Plan.
The application of Anvil 10 +10 in 2002 resulted in the death of
thousands of fish in freshwater lakes. In addition, the East Coast
has recently experienced a declining crab population as the use of
Anvil 10 + 10 in their salt marshes has interfered with the acceler-
ated sexual maturity and reproduction of female crabs. Not only
would such a decline in reproduction be detrimental to the envi-
ronment, but a decline in crab population and fish in lakes would
lead to severe economic loss for those who depend on such marine
life as a form of economic stability, including Ima Fisher.
Furthermore, the application of such larvicides and adulti-
cides without the requisite permits has raised doubts as to the le-
gality of such actions. According to the CWA, in order to discharge
any pollutant into waters, one first needs to obtain a permit from
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES").
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a) (2004). Such a permit is required
whenever one: 1) discharges, 2) a pollutant, 3) to navigable waters
4) from a point source. R. at 7 (citing Comm. To Save Mokelumne
River v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir. 1993)).
Responding to confusion over whether or not there was a need
for a permit under the CWA, the EPA issued several statements.
Most notably, in 2003, the EPA expressed their view that "pesti-
cide applications directly to water, and applications directly over
water, are not the discharge of 'pollutants' so long as they are done
in compliance with relevant FIFRA requirements, including label
instructions." R. at 6. (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 48,385 (Aug. 13, 2003)).
In addition, in 2005 the EPA issued a final guidance document'
and in 2007 issued the Pesticide Rule. Application of Pesticides to
1. 70 Fed. Reg. 5093 (Feb. 1, 2005).
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Waters of the United States in Compliance With FIFRA, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 68,483. The Pesticide Rule amends 40 C.F.R. §122.3 and
exempts from the CWA's permitting requirements, two categories
of pesticides: those applied directly to water to control pests in the
water and those applied over or near water to control pests over or
near water, provided that they comply with the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). Id.
On February 23, 2007, environmental plaintiffs commended
this action in order to challenge the EPA's authority to adopt such
exemptions from the permitting requirements. R. at 7. Since
commencing this action on February 23, 2007, plaintiffs became
aware of the intent of the City of Progress to soon commence
larviciding and adulticiding according to their Mosquito Control
plan. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Each of the environmental plaintiffs has standing in this ac-
tion b/c they satisfy the requisite constitutional, prudential, and
associational standing requirements. Plaintiffs Ima Fisher and
Sam Schwimmer demonstrate through affidavits that the Pesti-
cide Rule will interfere with their current ability to use Laconic
Bay commercially and recreationally. Such an interference consti-
tutes an injury sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing re-
quirement, because it is: (1) an "injury in fact," (2) causally related
to the Pesticide Rule, and (3) redressable by a favorable ruling
from this Court. Ima Fisher and Sam Schwimmer satisfy the pru-
dential standing requirements, because the interests that they
seek to protect are within the zone of interests regulated by the
CWA and their injury is not general to all citizens. Laconic
Baykeeper has standing in this action under the associational
standing doctrine because: (1) its individual members have stand-
ing, (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to its purpose,
and (3) its claim and requested relief do not require participation
by individual members.
The district court correctly determined that it had jurisdiction
to review the Pesticide Rule. Since, the Pesticide Rule cannot be
considered to constitute an "effluent limitation or other limitation"
or the issuing of a permit, section 509(b)(1) of the Clean Water Act
requiring exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals is inappli-
cable, and jurisdiction in the district court was proper. 33 U.S.C.
§1369(b)(1). Furthermore, district court review was proper, be-
cause there was neither statutory ambiguity over jurisdiction nor
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congressional authority to take judicial efficiency into
consideration.
Even if this Court finds that the action should have been orig-
inally adjudicated in the Court of Appeals pursuant to section
509(b)(1), this Court should equitably toll the one hundred twenty
day statute of limitations in favor of plaintiffs. Equitable tolling is
proper in this case since the plaintiffs exercised due diligence and
equitable tolling will not result in harm to the defendant.
The industry plaintiffs' claim-EPA's failure to expand the
Pesticide Rule was arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance
with law-is ripe under the doctrine under Abbot Laboratories v.
Gardner, because their claims were fit for judicial review, and
they would suffer hardship if the court withheld consideration.
First, the claim is fit for judicial review because it raises is purely
legal issue, consideration of the issue would benefit from a more
concrete setting, the Pesticide Rule is a final agency action. Sec-
ond, the industry plaintiffs would suffer hardship if the court
withheld consideration because they would be vulnerable to citi-
zen suits under the CWA, and would be forced to either go through
the expensive and time consuming process of applying for NPDES
permits or face potential civil liability.
Since the Clean Water Act expressly prohibits the discharge
of any pollutant absent a NPDES permit, EPA's adoption of the
Pesticide Rule which allows the discharge of chemical and biologi-
cal pesticides into water absent a permit is directly contrary to
Congressional intent, and therefore, not in accordance with law.
Even if this Court finds that Congress has not spoken directly to
the issue of whether pesticides are "pollutants" under the CWA,
EPA's adoption of the Pesticide Rule is not in accordance with law
because it is an impermissible construction of the CWA.
The industry plaintiffs' assertion that EPA's failure to include
within the Pesticide Rule pesticides applied in violation of FIFRA
and pesticides applied distant from water, but which drift into
water is without merit. Since the current Pesticide Rule is not in
accordance with law, and any extension of the rule is likewise not
in accordance with law. Even if this Court concludes that the Pes-
ticide Rule is in accordance with law, EPA's declination to extend
the rule is proper since it is a well established principle of Admin-
istrative Law that inaction by an agency is afforded a high level of
deference.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed de
novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Williams
v. Mo. Dept. of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2005).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "By its very terms, this stan-
dard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dis-
pute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
ARGUMENT
I. Environmental Plaintiffs Satisfy Article III's
Standing Requirements In Their Challenge Of
The EPA's Regulatory Action
Plaintiffs Ima Fisher and Sam Schwimmer each satisfy both
the constitutional and prudential requirements for standing.
Plaintiff Laconic Baykeeper, acting on behalf of its members, in-
cluding Ima Fisher and Sam Schwimmer, has associational stand-
ing in this action. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)
("Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have
standing solely as the representative of its members").
The constitutional standing requirement grounded in Article
III is satisfied if the plaintiff demonstrates: (1) an "injury in fact"
that is either actual or imminent; (2) the injury is causally related
to the action challenged; and (3) the injury is subject to redress by
the Court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561
(1992). The prudential standing requirement imposed by the judi-
ciary is satisfied if the plaintiff demonstrates: (1) the injury is
within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the provi-
sion being challenged, and (2) the injury is not shared by all citi-
zens. National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust
Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998). Each environmental plaintiff meets the
appropriate standing requirements.
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A. Constitutional Standing
1. Ima Fisher and Sam Schwimmer have established
that they have suffered an "injury in fact."
The district court properly determined that Ima Fisher and
Sam Schwimmer satisfied the 'injury in fact' requirement by
showing respectively that their personal enjoyment and economic
benefits would be abrogated if the Pesticide Rule was upheld. "In
environmental cases, the injury in fact requirement is met if an
individual member adequately shows that she or he has an eco-
nomic, aesthetic, or recreational interest in a particular place,
animal, or plant species and that the interest is impaired by the
challenged conduct." National Resources Defense Council v. EPA.,
437 F.Supp.2d 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2006). Further, Ima Fisher and
Sam Schwimmer demonstrate, through specific facts set forth in
their affidavits, that their injury is both concrete and particular-
ized and imminent. See generally Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
at 560.
Ima Fisher, in her affidavit, describes her use of Laconic Bay
as a third generation fisherperson. She states that should mos-
quito control pesticides be discharged into the lake and its adja-
cent marshlands, she would suffer economic injury because the
pesticides would kill and reduce the reproductive success of some
fish and crabs, the quantity of which she relies on for the success
of her business. Such economic harm has long been recognized by
the courts as a sufficient demonstration of concrete and particu-
larized injury. See Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d 915 (1st Cir. 1993)
(Milk producers sufficiently alleged particularized future eco-
nomic injury to support standing to challenge constitutionality of
milk pricing order.); National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Magaw,
132 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 1997) (Gun manufacturers and dealers had
standing to challenge the Crime Control Act because compliance
with the Act would have caused them immediate economic harm);
Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) (Power com-
pany had standing, because they suffered a competitive economic
injury).
Plaintiff Sam Schwimmer is a recreational user of Laconic
Bay and states that he uses the Bay and its adjacent marshlands
for swimming and bird watching. His affidavit states that should
the pesticides be discharged into the lake and adjacent marsh-
lands he would be less likely to swim there, because of fear that he
will be exposed to harmful chemicals. He also states that his bird
[Vol. 25
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watching may be diminished, because the chemicals would kill the
birds. While Schwimmer is not alleging any economic harm, "en-
vironmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they
aver that they use the affected area and are persons 'for whom the
aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened" by
the challenged activity."' Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S.
167, 183 (2000) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735
(1972)); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (Standing is not confined to those
who show economic harm, since aesthetic and environmental well-
being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of qual-
ity of life in our society.); see also Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at
562-563 ("Of course, the desire to use or observe an animal spe-
cies, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable
interest for purposes of standing.") Thus, Schwimmer, thru his
affidavits, has established that the challenged action would cause
him to suffer a concrete and particularized injury.
The "injury in fact" established by plaintiffs is imminent.
While no pesticides have actually been discharged into the water,
the impeding harm described in plaintiffs' affidavits satisfies the
imminence requirement.
Although imminence "is concededly a somewhat elastic concept,
[its purpose] is to ensure that the injury is not too speculative
for Article III purposes-that the injury is certainly impending."
Therefore, while an allegation of possible future injury does not
satisfy the requirements of Article III, an allegation of
threatened injury that is "certainly impending" does constitute
injury in fact, and does meet the constitutional threshold.
National Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n, MEBA, AFL-CIO v. Pena,
944 F.Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (quoting Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. at 565 n. 2); see also Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158; Brunet v.
City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 396 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1164 (1994). "Plaintiffs need not wait until the city has actu-
ally caused harm to Laconic Bay before challenging the regulatory
scheme under which the City claims a right to act" R. at 9 (citing
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (A "threatened
injury" will satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement for standing),
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1987) (In a citizen
suit under the Clean Water Act, the Court proceeded on the issue
of whether the district court should have enjoined continued oper-
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ations pending receipt of an NPDES permit, even though the dis-
trict court found no harm to the waterway.) See Village of Elk
Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding
standing because "the Village is in the path of a potential flood"
and "even a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case
or controversy.").
EPA and the Industry Plaintiffs may attempt disprove immi-
nence by likening this case to Defenders of Wildlife. Such an at-
tempt is without merit. In Defenders of Wildlife, the Court found
that affidavits stating that plaintiffs previously traveled to places
in the world to observe endangered species and that the plaintiffs
hoped to one day return and observe endangered species in those
locations did not show that damage to species from the challenged
action would produce imminent injury to them. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555. In this case, the plaintiffs' affidavits allege
injury to actions that the plaintiffs engage in on a daily basis at a
body of water in close proximity to them. Such injury is not com-
parable to the "'some day' intentions" to visit endangered species
that were found insufficient in Defenders of Wildlife.
In addition, because birds and mosquitoes have recently been
found to be infected with West Nile Virus in the vicinity of Laconic
Bay and the City of New Union will soon implement their Mos-
quito Control Plan, the harm to the plaintiffs imminent now more
than ever.
2. Ima Fisher and Sam Schwimmer have established
that the injury is causally related to the action
challenged.
The plaintiffs' injuries identified above are sufficiently casu-
ally related to EPA's promulgation of the Pesticide Rule to estab-
lish standing. "In order to demonstrate that they are more than
concerned bystanders, plaintiffs need only show that there is a
substantial likelihood that defendant's conduct caused plaintiffs
harm." Public Interest Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc.,
913 F.2d 64, 72 (3rd Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted); see
also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59
(1978) (finding that causation requirement for standing can be
satisfied absent direct proof of injury.); Sierra Club v. Cedar Point
Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that relying on
circumstantial evidence in determining causation is appropriate
given that the "threshold for injury requirement is fairly low.")
[Vol. 25528
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The environmental plaintiffs' affidavits, which set forth the
harm caused by the use of aquatic pesticides in other lakes and
salt marshes, establishes a "substantial likelihood" that Pesticide
Rule will cause similar harm to Laconic Bay. Particularly, the af-
fidavits claim that the active ingredient in the aquatic pesticide
which the City plans to use has been shown to cause the die-off of
freshwater fish and the declination of crab populations. R. at 6.
Furthermore, the general concern that exposure to chemicals in
Laconic Bay will have negative health effects on recreational
users of Laconic Bay, including Sam Schwimmer, is sufficient to
establish the requisite causation for standing. See Duke Power
Co., 438 U.S. at 74 (plaintiffs who lived near a nuclear power
plant had standing since "the emission of non-natural radiation
into appellees' environment would also seem a direct and present
injury, given our generalized concern about exposure to radia-
tion"); Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d at 557-558
(plaintiffs who asserted that discharge of pollutants in Galveston
Bay would lessen their enjoyment of the bay had standing even
though they failed to produce any direct scientific or visual evi-
dence of harm to the water). The plaintiffs' affidavits demonstrat-
ing their concern about the pollution of Laconic Bay's water with
toxins, is sufficiently causally related to the EPA's rulemaking as
to satisfy the 'injury in fact' requirement.
3. Ima Fisher and Sam Schwimmer have established
that the injury is subject to redress by the
court.
The environmental plaintiffs' injuries will be redressed by a
favorable decision by this Court. The redressibility requirement
of standing, "examines the causal connection between the alleged
injury and the judicial relief requested." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 753 n. 19 (1984). Should EPA's rulemaking be found invalid,
the City's Mosquito Control Plan would not longer be allowed to
dump pollutants directly into Laconic Bay and its surrounding
wetlands. Instead, they would be subject to the CWA's permitting
requirements.
The purpose of the Act is to restore the chemical, physical and
biological integrity of the nation's waters. Where a plaintiff com-
plains of harm to water quality because a defendant exceeded
its permit limits, an injunction will redress that injury at least
in part ... Plaintiffs need not show that the waterway will be
2008] 529
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returned to pristine condition in order to satisfy the minimal
requirements of Article III.
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duf-
fryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 73 (3rd Cir. 1990). Similarly,
requiring a NPDES permit for the discharge of aquatic pesticides
will redress the environmental plaintiffs' injuries which are
caused by the unregulated discharge of pollutants under the
Clean Water Act. Furthermore, the environmental plaintiffs do
not need to prove that the Laconic Bay will remain in its current
condition if the Pesticide Rule is struck down and aquatic pesti-
cides are discharged into the bay pursuant to a NPDES permit.
The NPDES permit will ensure a certain level of water quality in
the bay that will not be ensured if no permit is required.
B. Prudential Standing
Ima Fisher and Sam Schwimmer satisfy the prudential stand-
ing requirements, because the interests that they seek to protect
are within the zone of interests regulated by the CWA and their
injury is not general to all citizens. "In addition to the immutable
requirements of Article III, "the federal judiciary has also adhered
to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of stand-
ing."2 Mudd v. White, 309 F.3d 819, 824 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
"Prudential standing exists if the interest that the plaintiff
seeks to protect is "arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected or regulated by the statute . . . in question." Courtney v.
Smith, 297 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2002) (ellipsis in original) (quoting
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970)). Ima Fisher and Sam Schwimmer's interest in pro-
tecting the integrity and water quality of Laconic Bay in order to
ensure their continued economic and recreational use of the Bay is
within the zone of interest protected by the Clean Water Act. See
Puerto Rico Campers' Ass'n. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer
Authority, 219 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.P.R.2002) Action by campers as-
sociation seeking to enforce NPDES permit requirements for
waste water treatment plant fell within zone of interests of Clean
Water Act); Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251
2. Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) permits injured par-
ties to obtain judicial review of agency actions that allegedly violate federal statutes
*.. A plaintiff seeking judicial review of agency action under the APA, however, must
not only meet the constitutional requirements of standing, but must also demonstrate
prudential standing. Courtney v. Smith, 297 F.3d 455 (2002) 460-461.
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(D.C. Cir. 2004) (Action by environmental organization challeng-
ing EPA's standards for radiation exposure was within the zone of
interests protected by the Energy Policy Act, which seeks to en-
sure the safe operation of nuclear power plants).
Furthermore, prudential standing requires that, "a plaintiffs
claim must be more than a 'generalized grievance' that is perva-
sively shared by a large class of citizens." Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); see Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Em-
ployees v. Cheney, 883 F.2d 1038, 1047 (D.C. Cir.1989). However,
"to deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply be-
cause many others are also injured, would mean that the most
injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned
by nobody." U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Pro-
cedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688.
The injury suffered by Ima Fisher is specific to her business
as a commercial fisherwoman who fishes in Laconic Bay. The in-
jury suffered by Sam Schwimmer is specific to his status as a rec-
reational swimmer and birdwatcher in and near Laconic Bay.
Such injuries are not shared by all citizens and are not compara-
ble to injuries found by the courts to be too generalized to confer
standing upon the plaintiffs. Compare Valley Forge Christian Col-
lege v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982) (being deprived of fair and constitutional use
of tax dollars is too general to meet prudential standing require-
ments) with Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d
1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (interests of consumers affected by decision
of Secretary of Agriculture refusing to suspend registration of cer-
tain pesticides not too generalized to confer standing).
C. Laconic Baykeeper, Inc. has associational standing on
behalf of Ima Fisher and Sam Schwimmer.
Even if the organization has not suffered injury to itself, it may
have standing to assert the rights of its members if (1) its mem-
bers would have standing to sue on their own; (2) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and (3) its claim and
requested relief do not require participation by individual
members.
Salmon v. Pacific Lumber Co., 30 F.Supp.2d 1231, 1238 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333 (1977)).
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As discussed above, two of Laconic Baykeers' members, Ima
Fisher and Sam Schwimmer, have standing in this action. See
supra pp. 7-14. Furthermore, since the claim does not require the
participation of Laconic Baykeepers' individual members, only the
germaneness requirement is left to discuss.
Laconic Baykeepers satisfies the germaneness requirement
for associational standing. "It remains only to note that in thus
characterizing the germaneness requirement as mandating mere
pertinence between litigation subject and organizational purpose,
we join a number of other courts which, without any detailed anal-
ysis of prong two, have declared it undemanding." Humane Soc. of
the U.S. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing National
Constructors Association v. National Electrical Contractors Associ-
ation, 498 F.Supp. 510, 521 (D. Md.1980) (defining germaneness
standard as allowing suits by groups whose purposes are "perti-
nent or relevant to" claim at issue); American Insurance Associa-
tion v. Selby, 624 F.Supp. 267, 271 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating that "an
association's litigation interests must be truly unrelated to its or-
ganizational interests before a court will declare that those inter-
ests are not germane"); Medical Association of Alabama v.
Schweiker, 554 F.Supp. 955, 965 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (stating that ger-
maneness test requires that "the injury to [an association's] mem-
bers has some reasonable connection with the reason the members
joined the organization and with the objectives of the
organization")).
Laconic Baykeepers is a non-profit environmental organiza-
tion whose members are various recreational and commercial
users of Laconic Bay. The members have a common interest in
protecting the water quality in Laconic Bay.
The doctrine of associational standing recognizes that the pri-
mary reason people join an organization is often to create an
effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with
others. "The only practical judicial policy when people pool their
capital, their interests, or their activities under a name and
form that will identify collective interests, often is to permit the
association or corporation in a single case to vindicate the inter-
ests of all."
Salmon, 30 F.Supp.2d at 1240 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951) (Jackson, J., con-
curring). Thus, the interests that Laconic Baykeepers seeks to
protect-the water quality of Laconic Bay-is germane to its pur-
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pose of ensuring the continued recreational and environmental
use of the bay for its members. See Human Soc. of the U.S., 840
F.2d 45 (holding that goals sought to be served by animal protec-
tion organization in bringing suit challenging Fish and Wildlife
Service's expansion of hunting in wildlife refuges were pertinent
to the organization's purposes, so that it had standing to sue as
an organization.).
II. Jurisdiction in the District Court was Proper
The district court correctly determined that it had jurisdiction
to review the Pesticide Rule. Defendants claim that the chal-
lenges to the Pesticide Rule should have been brought directly in
the Court of Appeals pursuant to section 509(b)(1) of the CWA. R.
at 9. Specifically, EPA argues that at issue here is an action that
concerns an "effluent limitation or other limitation" under section
509(b)(1)(E), or an action "issuing or denying a permit" under sec-
tion § 509(b)(1)(F). Id. As such, the EPA claims that review falls
under the specific jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However,
this claim must fail because the Pesticide Rule cannot be consid-
ered to constitute an "effluent limitation or other limitation" or
the issuing of a permit, and jurisdiction in the district court was
proper. See Northwest Environmental Advocates, et al, v. EPA,
2005 WL 756614 (N.D.Cal. 2005) (finding that a review of identi-
cal exemptions under the CWA regulations was proper in the Dis-
trict Court.)
A. The regulations at issue do not constitute an "effluent
limitation or other limitation."
First, Pesticide Rule does not constitute an "effluent limita-
tion or other limitation" as provided for under section 509(b)(1)(E)
of the CWA. 33. U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E) (emphasis added). The Pes-
ticide Rule does not provide any limitations upon the actions of
individuals. On the contrary, it eliminates previous limitations
that were in place, and therefore, does not rise to the requisite
level to constitute an "effluent limitation."
The regulations entirely exempting certain kinds of pesticide
application from the NPDES permit program cannot in any
sense of the word be considered an "effluent limitation or other
limitation." Far from limiting anything, the regulations in
question are permissive and remove specified pesticide activi-
ties from the limitations of CWA.
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R. at 9.
Since the Pesticide Rule does not concern an "effluent limita-
tion," EPA argues that it can be considered to constitute "other
limitations" and thus render jurisdictional review in the Court of
Appeals proper section 509(b)(1)(E). R. at 9. Specifically, EPA
turns to cases in which the court reviewed the regulations that
expanded the scope of the NPDES permitting requirements and
argues that the regulations in those cases were subject to direct
review under section 509 of the CWA. See Envtl. Def. Ctr. V. EPA,
344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003); Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 965 F.2d
759 (9th Cir. 1992). While it is true that both of the cases cited by
the EPA required review under the section 509, EPA fails to make
key distinctions between the cases cited and the case at hand.
Specifically, the EPA fails to recognize that the issue is both cases
involved expanding the scope of permitting activities.
"[O]bviously, regulations that expand the scope of permitting ac-
tivities and define the procedures for obtaining permits are very
different from a regulation providing an exemption from permit-
ting entirely." R. at 10. Therefore, while direct review to the
Court of Appeals may be necessary in cases which serve to expand
the scope of activities in order to obtain a permit, no such direct
review is necessary for the Pesticide Rule, because it eliminates
the need for a permit altogether.
B. The regulations at issue do not constitute the
"issuing or denying of a permit."
Second, the regulations at issue do not constitute the "issuing
or denying of a permit" under section 509(b)(1)(F) of the CWA. 33
U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F). In order to be considered a permit, there
would need to be conditions and limitations in place specifically
designed to meet water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a),
1311(b), 1312(a). The regulations in question contain neither con-
ditions nor limitations designed to meet water quality standards.
In fact, the regulations mention nothing about meeting or even
maintaining water quality standards, but focus instead upon what
can be introduced into water sources.
The effect of the Pesticide Rule is actually opposite to the is-
suing or denying of a permit. "[T]he Pesticide Rule can hardly be
considered an action "issuing or denying a permit" as the effect of
the Pesticide Rule is to remove the specified activities from the
permitting program entirely." R. at 9. Therefore, the regulations
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cannot be seen as the issuing or denying of a permit as the EPA
argues, and review under the District Court was proper.
C. District court review was proper because there was
neither statutory ambiguity over jurisdiction nor
any congressional authority to take judicial
efficiency into consideration.
1. District Court Review was proper as there was no
statutory ambiguity over which court had
jurisdiction.
EPA further argues that whenever there is an ambiguity as to
which court is to grant judicial review, the ambiguity is to be re-
solved in favor of the Court of Appeals, however, the district court
was correct in finding "no ambiguity in the language of the CWA
§ 509(b)(1)." R. at 10. In support of its claim, EPA cites Tennessee
v. Herrington, 806 F.2d 642, 650 (6th Cir. 1986) and Suburban
O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186, 192 (7th Cir. 1986) and con-
cludes that judicial review would have been proper with the Court
of Appeals and not the District Court. This argument however,
fails to take into consideration the necessary element of an "ambi-
guity." In the case at hand, there is no ambiguity as to where ju-
risdiction lies. Since there is neither an "effluent limitation or
other limitation" nor is there the "issuing or denying [of] a per-
mit", there is no reason that the Court of Appeals would have ex-
clusive jurisdiction.
2. Judicial efficiency argument flawed.
EPA further argues that jurisdiction laid with the Court of
Appeals for judicial efficiency's sake. According to EPA, judicial
efficiency would have been served by having a single review in a
Court of Appeals rather than possible multiple reviews in the dis-
trict court. While judicial efficiency may have been served, "These
arguments should be addressed to Congress, not to this Court, as
the language of section § 509(b)(1) simply cannot be stretched to
include a regulatory exclusion within the ambit of either a 'limita-
tion or an 'approval or denial of a permit."' R. at 10. Had Congress
deemed judicial efficiency important enough to warrant direct re-
view to a Court of Appeals, they would have made their intent
clear when drafting the Clean Water Act. EPA is without author-
ity to argue judicial efficiency, and such an argument has no bear-
ing on jurisdiction.
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III. The Court Should Equitably Toll The 120 Day
Statute Of Limitations Of The CWA § 509(B)(1).
Should this court disagree with the district court and inter-
pret the terms of the Clean Water Act to require automatic review
to the Court of Appeals, then this court should equitably toll the
one hundred twenty day statute of limitations in favor of environ-
mental plaintiffs.
A. Plaintiffs exercised due diligence
The plaintiffs exercised due diligence in commencing this ac-
tion in the district court. The tolling of a statute of limitations is
generally applicable when a plaintiff has timely filed suit in an
improper forum, but otherwise exercised due diligence. See Bur-
nett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965). The
statute of limitations should be tolled if this court finds that action
was timely filed in the wrong court. See Burnett, 380 U.S. 424
(statute of limitations tolled where the plaintiff timely filed his
action in state court which was later dismissed for improper
venue.). In Burnett, even though the statute of limitations had
run prior to the filing in federal court, the state court's dismissal
for improper venue tolled the statute and allowed petitioners to
timely file appeal in federal court. Id. Similarly, since environ-
mental plaintiffs timely filed this action in federal district court, if
this court finds that the district court was an improper venue, the
statue of limitations should toll in favor of the environmental
plaintiffs.
B. Equitable tolling will result in no harm to the
defendants
The statute of limitations should toll in favor of the environ-
mental plaintiffs since the EPA had adequate notice of the litiga-
tion. "The basic question to be answered in determining whether,
under a given set of facts, a statute of limitations is to be tolled, is
one 'of legislative intent whether the right shall be enforceable...
after the prescribed time."' Burnet, 380 U.S. at 426. In consider-
ing such legislative intent, the Court focused on the underlying
policy rational for enforcing statute of limitations, namely the un-
just effect of not giving the defendant adequate notice.3 See Rail-
3. In reference to the statute of limitations, the CWA states that "[ainy such ap-
plication shall be made within 120 days from the date of such determination, ap-
proval, promulgation, issuance or denial, or after such date only if such application is
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road Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-349 (1944). In Burnett, the statute of limitations tolled since
the filing of the action in state court placed the defendants on
proper notice and gave them adequate time to prepare. Similarly,
in the case at hand, the EPA was not only on notice, but was actu-
ally in the process of litigating the same matter before a District
Court. In addition, since the District Court ruled that there was
jurisdiction to hear the case, the EPA was on full notice that liti-
gation was pending and imminent.
IV. The Industry Petitions' Challenge is Ripe Under
the Doctrine of Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner.
The district court erred in finding that the industry plaintiffs'
claims were not ripe for judicial review. R. 10. The ripeness in-
quiry under the doctrine Abbot Laboratories v. Gardener is two-
fold, and requires the court "to evaluate both the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of with-
holding court consideration." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 149 (1967). In order for their claims to be ripe, it is not
necessary for this Court to find that the industry plaintiffs satisfy
both of the Abbott considerations. Instead, "if the court 'ha[s]
doubts about the fitness of the issue
for judicial resolution,' it will 'balance the institutional inter-
ests in postponing review against the hardship to the parties that
will result from delay."' and where "there are no significant
agency or judicial interests militating in favor of delay, [lack of]
hardship cannot tip the balance against judicial review." National
Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 440 F.3d
459, 465 (2006) (quoting Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d
752, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). The industry plaintiffs' challenge to the
Pesticide Rule does, however, satisfy both of the Abbott considera-
tions and is sufficiently ripe.
A. The industry plaintiffs' challenge to the Pesticide
Rule is fit for judicial decision.
"In determining the fitness of an issue for judicial review we
look to see whether the issue 'is purely legal, whether considera-
based solely on grounds which arose after such 120th day." CWA § 509(b)(1), 33
U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1). The term "or after such date" indicates that Congress had the
intent to allow a plaintiff to file a claim, after the statutory period has run, if the
grounds on which the claim is based arose after the 120 period.
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tion of the issue would benefit from a more concrete setting, and
whether the agency's action is sufficiently final."' Clean Air Im-
plementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(internal quotations omitted).
1. The issue is purely legal
The issue raised by the industry plaintiffs-whether EPA's
failure to broaden the Pesticide Rule is arbitrary and capricious or
not in accordance with law-is a purely legal issue. Sprint v.
F.C.C., 331 F.3d 952, 956 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (the question of whether
an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious is a "purely legal
question"); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027,
1039 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (challenge to rule as contrary to statute
presented pure question of law). Purely legal questions are pre-
sumptively reviewable. National Min. Ass'n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d
752, 757 (2003).
2. Consideration of the issue would benefit from a
more concrete setting
EPA's Pesticide Rule states that pesticide applications di-
rectly to water and directly over water are not the discharge of
"pollutants" if they are applied in compliance with the FIFRA.
However it remains unclear if the application of aerial pesticides
that may drift and end up in surface waters is a discharge of a
"pollutant" as defined in the CWA, thus requiring a NPDES per-
mit. Judicial consideration of the industry plaintiffs' claim will
crystallize the Pesticide Rule.
The district court erroneously determined that, "[i]industry
plaintiffs' challenge is not fit for judicial review as the question of
whether particular terrestrial applications of pesticides involve
discharges into water is highly fact bound." R. at 10. In National
Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 440 F.3d
459 (2006), the D.C. Circuit, in reviewing a similar ripeness issue,
rejected this reasoning stating that it "does not support postpon-
ing review for lack of ripeness." National Ass'n of Home Builders,
440 F.3d 459 (2006). There the industry plaintiffs challenged
EPA's promulgation of the Tulloch Rule which defined the "dis-
charge" of dredged material under the CWA. Id. The District
Court found that the industry plaintiffs' challenge was not ripe
because of the fact-specific nature in determining what is regul-
able discharge. 311 F.Supp.2d 91, 98 (D.D.C. 2004). The Court of
Appeals reversed the district court's finding holding that "[w]hile
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the final determination of whether to require a permit in a given
case will, as is usual in an agency adjudication, rest on case-spe-
cific findings, this fact does not diminish the fitness of 'Tulloch II'
for review." National Ass'n of Home Builders, 440 F.3d 459, 464.
Likewise, this court should find that despite the fact-specific na-
ture of whether the application of certain pesticides requires a
NPDES permit, the industry plaintiffs' challenge of the Pesticide
Rule is reviewable.
3. The agency's action is sufficiently final
Finality is satisfied, because the Pesticide Rule was published
as a final rule in the Federal Register after notice and comment.
Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compli-
ance With FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483.
B. The industry plaintiffs will suffer hardship if the
court withholds consideration.
The district court found that there is not hardship to the in-
dustry plaintiffs in deferring review because, "[n]one of the indus-
try plaintiffs have been subject to enforcement for their activities,
and no such enforcement has been threatened." R. at 11." The dis-
trict court is mistaken. Even if the industry plaintiffs don't face
enforcement by EPA, after the promulgation of the Pesticide Rule,
they are vulnerable to citizen suits involving pesticide discharges
that are not exempt by the rule, namely the application of certain
pesticides that drift into water and the application of pesticides
that do not comply with FIFRA. See No Spray Coalition v. City of
New York, 351 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 2003) (CWA authorizes any citi-
zen to bring suit to enforce its requirements, regardless of
whether the claimed CWA violation also violated FIFRA). In addi-
tion, even if the industry plaintiffs prevailed in such a case, the
cost of litigating alone is a significant hardship.
The Court in National Ass'n of Home Builders found hardship
to the plaintiffs since they "face [d] the choice of applying for a per-
mit for activities Industry claims are outside the scope of the
Corps' and EPA's authority under section 404 or face civil or crimi-
nal enforcement penalties for failing to do so." Id. at 465. See also
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, (1967) 387 U.S. 136 (hardship re-
quirement was satisfied in pre-enforcement action for declaratory
judgment, because the affected companies either had to expend
substantial amounts of money to comply with the regulations or
not comply and risk serious criminal and civil penalties); National
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Rifle Ass'n of America v. Magaw (Firearm manufacturers and
dealers' declaratory judgment action challenging portions of
Crime Control Act on equal protection and commerce clause
grounds was fit for judicial review, even though no prosecution
was pending). Similarly each industry plaintiff faces the choice of
either applying for a NPDES permit for pesticide applications
outside of the scope of the Pesticide Rule or facing civil penalties
V. The Pesticide Rule's Exemption of Certain
Pesticide Applications From the Clean Air Act's
Permitting Program is Not in Accordance
With the Law
Since the Clean Water Act expressly prohibits the discharge
of any pollutant absent a NPDES permit, EPA's adoption of the
Pesticide Rule which allows the discharge of chemical and biologi-
cal pesticides into water absent a permit is directly contrary to
Congressional intent, and therefore, not in accordance with law.
This Court "shall... hold unlawful and set aside agency actions,
findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act §706(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. §555 (2000). In
order to determine if EPA's promulgation of the Pesticide Rule is
not in accordance with law, this Court must apply the two-part
Chevron test. First, the Court asks whether Congress directly ad-
dressed the issue at hand in the plain language or legislative his-
tory of the Clean Water Act. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Second, the
Court asks whether the agency's interpretation is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute. Id. If the agency's action is
either contrary to the plain language or legislative history or not a
permissible construction of the statute, this Court shall set aside
the agency's action. Here, the "Pesticide's Rule" fails both steps of
Chevron, and accordingly, the Pesticide Rule should be struck
down.
A. EPA's adoption of the Pesticide Rule is contrary to
the Clean Water Act's plain language and
legislative history.
Under the CWA, "Any activity is subject to NPDES permit re-
quirements when it 1) discharges, i.e. adds, 2) a pollutant 3) to
navigable waters 4) from a point source." R. at 7. (citing Comm.
To Save Mokelumne River v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305,
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308 (9th Cir. 1993)). There is no dispute that the pesticide appli-
cation mechanisms are "point sources." Therefore, "the validity of
the Pesticide Rule... turns on the question whether the definition
of 'pollutant' under CWA §502(6) unambiguously includes the pes-
ticides in question." R. at 11. "Pollutant" as defined by section
502(6) of the CWA includes, "dredged spoil, solid waste, incinera-
tor residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical
wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked
or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, mu-
nicipal, and agricultural waste." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2004). The
district court correctly determined that bacteriological pesticides
applied directly to water and chemical and bacteriological pesti-
cides applied over or near water are "pollutants" within the plain
language of the statute. The district court erred, however, in con-
cluding that chemical pesticides applied directly to water were not
"pollutants" within the plain language of the statute.
All pesticides that end up in Laconic Bay are "pollutants"
under the CWA. Particularly, biological pesticides are "biological
materials," and chemical pesticides, are "chemical wastes." EPA,
however, takes the following position:
First, such pesticides are not "chemical wastes." The term
'waste' ordinarily that which is 'eliminated or discarded as no
longer useful or required after the completion of a process.' Pes-
ticides applied consistent with relevant FIFRA requirements
are not 'wastes' as that term is commonly defined... EPA also
interprets the term 'biological materials' not to include biologi-
cal pesticides applied consistent with relevant FIFRA require-
ments . . . Since biologically and chemically based pesticides
applied consistent with relevant requirements adopted by EPA
under FIFRA are both EPA-evaluated products, treating them
differently under the Clean Water Act is not warranted.
Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compli-
ance With FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,486 (quoting The New Ox-
ford American Dictionary 1905 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank
Abate eds., 2001)). EPA's position is directly contrary to the plain
language in the statute.
. Chemical pesticides applied over or near water and directly to
water are "chemical wastes," because after the chemicals serve
their intended purpose of killing pests, they are wastes that either
end up in water or remain in water. As the district court stated,
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non-aquatic pesticides that fall into water after being used to
kill pests that are not present in water are within the dictionary
definition of materials that are eliminated ... as no longer use-
ful. Neither EPA nor the industry plaintiffs argue that these
non-aquatic pesticides serve any useful purpose once they hit
the water. Accordingly, they fall within the common under-
standing of the term "chemical wastes" and under the unambig-
uous statutory language must be subject to the NPDES
permitting requirements.
R. at 12-13 (internal quotations omitted); see Headwaters, Inc. v.
Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
an aquatic herbicide used to kill weeds and algae was a pollutant
under the CWA); League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains
Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that insecticides sprayed over national forests lands was
a pollutant under the CWA).
Similarly chemical pesticides applied directly to water are
chemical wastes, because residual chemicals remain in the water
after the pesticide kills pests in water.
Although it would seem absurd to conclude that a toxic chemical
directly poured into water is not a pollutant, we need not decide
that issue because we agree with the district court that the
residual acrolein left in the water after its application qualifies
as a chemical waste product and thus as a 'pollutant' under the
CWA.
Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532-533
(9th Cir. 2001). EPA acknowledges that residual pesticide chemi-
cals that remain in water are pollutants within the definition of
the CWA, but attempts to justify the Pesticide Rule by claiming
that the pesticides, as originally applied, are not pollutants, be-
cause at the time of their discharge they are intended to kill pests.
71 Fed. Reg. at 68,487. EPA's argument is flawed, because the
Clean Water Act does not exempt pollutants that first serve a ben-
eficial purpose. See U.S. Public Interest Research Group v. Heri-
tage Salmon, Inc., 2002 WL 240440 (D. Me. 2002) ("[T]he
classification of a substance as a 'pollutant' does not involve con-
sideration of the intended use of the substance nor the reason for
which it was released into the waters."); Sarah Slack, When is a
Pesticide Not a Pollutant? Never: An Analysis of the EPA's Mis-
guided Guidance, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1241, 1266 (2005) ("the use of a
pesticide for its intended purpose cannot negate the fact that the
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pesticide is a pollutant under the CWA"). "[A] pollutant is a pollu-
tant no matter how useful it once may have been." Hudson River
Fisherman's Ass'n v. City of New York, 751 F.Supp 1088, 1101
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that chlorine residual, when discharged
into navigable waters, was a "pollutant" within meaning of the
Act, even though its intended use was beneficial.). Since EPA rec-
ognized that pesticides applied in certain instances are "pollu-
tants" subject to the NPDES permit requirements of the CWA,
EPA's position that a pesticide is not a pollutant if at the time of
the pesticide's release it is not waste does not hold water, since
every pesticide is released with the initial purpose to kill pests.
Biological pesticides that are applied over or near water and
to water are biological materials and therefore, pollutants under
the plain language of the CWA. "extension of this exemption [Pes-
ticide Rule] to bacteriological pesticides runs afoul of the unam-
biguously expressed congressional intent to require permits for all
'biological materials' discharged into water, whether to not they
constitute 'wastes."' R. at 12. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consum-
ers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir.1988) (finding that live
fish, dead fish and fish remains are pollutants under the CWA,
since they are 'biological materials"); U.S. Public Interest Research
Group v. Atlantic Salmon, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239 (D. Me. 2002) (find-
ing that non-native salmon that are released into the bay are pol-
lutants under the Clean Water Act, because they are "biological
materials.").4
The legislative history of the Clean Water Act indicates Con-
gress's intent to regulate pesticides. The Senate report specifi-
cally addresses the danger of pesticides as applied by nonpoint
sources.
One of the most significant aspects of this year's hearings on the
pending legislation was the information presented on the degree
to which nonpoint sources contribute to water pollution. Agri-
cultural runoff, animal wastes, soil erosion, fertilizers, pesti-
cides and other farm chemicals that are a part of runoff,
construction runoff and siltation from mines and acid mine
drainage are major contributors to the Nation's water pollution
4. Further evidence that Congress intended for pesticides to be regulated under
the CWA, is the specific reference to pesticides in other sections of the CWA. Section
104 (1) of the CWA requires the, "[collection and dissemination of scientific knowledge
on effects and control of pesticides in water." 33 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000); see Slack,
supra at 1265.
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problem. Little has been done to control this major source of
pollution.
S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3705. Congress was clearly concerned with the affect that pesti-
cides have on the integrity of the nation's waters. An interpreta-
tion of the CWA exempting the application of pesticides from point
sources from the NPDES permitting requirements is contrary to
Congress's expressed concern regarding the danger of pesticides.
"Congress undoubtedly recognized the pollution problem caused
by pesticides, and intended that their application would trigger
the NPDES permitting requirements." Slack, supra at 1268.
B. EPA's adoption of the Pesticide Rule constitutes an
impermissible construction of the Clean Water Act.
The Court should find that Congress has spoken directly to
the issue of whether pesticides are "pollutants" under the CWA.
Even if the Court does not reach this conclusion, EPA's adoption of
the Pesticide Rule fails the second step of Chevron, because it is
an impermissible construction of the CWA. The Pesticide Rule
removes certain applications of pesticides from the ambit of the
Clean Water Act if the pesticides are properly registered with
EPA under FIFRA. The EPA does not dispute that pesticides are
"pollutants" under the Clean Water Act in other instances. Appli-
cation of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance
With FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,487. Therefore, EPA's determina-
tion that pesticides applied over or near water or directly to water
in compliance with FIFRA are not "pollutants" under the CWA is
only a pretext for using FIFRA to preempt the CWA with regard to
the application of certain pesticides. Since Congress did not ex-
pressly mandate that pesticide regulation under FIFRA pre-
empted pesticide regulation under the CWA, EPA's Pesticide Rule
is an impermissible construction of the CWA. "The courts are not
at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and
when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the
courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the
contrary, to regard each as effective." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 551 (1974); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198
(1939) ('When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is
to give effect to both if possible ... The intention of the legislature
to repeal 'must be clear and manifest.'")
The Court in Headwaters put it best:
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The CWA and FIFRA have different, although complementary,
purposes. The CWA's objective "is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters," and to that end the statute requires a NPDES permit
before any pollutant can be discharged into navigable waters
from a point source. FIFRA's objective is to protect human
health and the environment from harm from pesticides, and to
that end the statute establishes a nationally uniform pesticide
labeling system requiring the registration of all pesticides and
herbicides sold in the United States and requiring users to com-
ply with the national label. Even this cursory review of the
statutes reveals that a FIFRA label and a NPDES permit serve
different purposes. FIFRA establishes a nationally uniform la-
beling system to regulate pesticide use, but does not establish a
system for granting permits for individual applications of herbi-
cides. The CWA establishes national effluent standards to regu-
late the discharge of all pollutants into the waters of the United
States, but also establishes a permit program that allows, under
certain circumstances, individual discharges. FIFRA's labels are
the same nationwide, and so the statute does not and cannot
consider local environmental conditions. By contrast, the
NPDES program under the CWA does just that.
Headwaters, 243 F.3d. at 531 (citations omitted).
VI. The Failure Of The Pesticide Rule To Include
Within Its Exemption Pesticide Residues,
Pesticides Applied In Violation Of Fifra
Requirements, And Pesticides Applied
Distant From Water But Which Drift Into Water
Is Not Arbitrary And Capricious, An Abuse Of
Discretion, Or Otherwise Not In Accordance
With The Law
The industry plaintiffs assert that EPA's failure to include
within the Pesticide Rule pesticides applied in violation of FIFRA
and pesticides applied distant from water, but which drift into
water. As seen in Argument V of this Brief, the current Pesticide
Rule is not in accordance with law, and any extension of the rule is
likewise not in accordance with law. See supra pp. 26-33.
Even if the Court concludes that the Pesticide Rule is in ac-
cordance with law, EPA's declination to extend the rule is proper.
It is a well established principle of Administrative Law, that inac-
tion by an agency is afforded a high level of deference. Adminis-
trative agencies, "ha[ve] considerable discretion in responding to
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requests to institute proceedings or to promulgate rules, even
though it possesses the authority to do so should it see fit. Admin-
istrative rule making does not ordinarily comprehend any rights
in private parties to compel an agency to institute such proceed-
ings or promulgate rules." Action for Children's Television v. FCC,
564 F.2d 458, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (internal quotations omitted).
EPA's decision not to extend the Pesticide Rule constitutes agency
inaction and is akin to EPA's decision not to promulgate a rule in
the first place.
The standard for reviewing EPA's failure to extend the Pesti-
cide Rule is extremely deferential and is "limited to ensuring that
the agency has adequately explained the facts and policy concerns
it relied on, and that the facts have some basis in the record." Na-
tional Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. DOE, 851 F.2d 1424,
1430 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Thus, "[i]t is only in the
rarest and most compelling of circumstances that th[e] court has
acted to overturn an agency judgment not to institute rulemak-
ing." WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In
its promulgation of the Pesticide Rule EPA responded to the in-
dustry plaintiffs' request that the rule be extended to include ad-
ditional pesticide applications.
EPA is continuing to consider the applicability of the CWA to
situations other than those EPA is addressing in today's action
where pesticides applied in accordance with relevant FIFRA re-
quirements may reach and enter waters of the United States,
including drift of pesticides applied aerially over land. There-
fore, EPA does not believe it is appropriate to broaden the scope
of the regulation to include additional types of pesticide applica-
tions at this time. To assist the Agency's consideration of these
issues, EPA has established a workgroup under the existing
Pesticide Program Dialogue Committee (PPDC) (an advisory
committee chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA)) to address issues involving pesticide spray drift from
agricultural and other applications.
Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compli-
ance With FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,488. Since EPA has ad-
dressed the industry plaintiffs' request to extend the Pesticide
Rule and stated in the record their reason for declining such an
extension, their omission of certain pesticide application from the
Pesticide Rule is appropriate.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the environmental plaintiffs re-
spectfully request that this court uphold the district court's partial
grant of the environmental plaintiffs summary judgment and re-
verse the district court's partial denial of the environmental plain-
tiffs summary judgment.
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